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Abstract
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case
of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash
equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly
higher value. Hence, in such environments the Nash equilibrium predictions are robust to pre-
play communication between the bidders. If there are three or more symmetric bidders, or two
symmetric bidders and a positive reserve price, then there may exist correlated and commu-
nication equilibria such that the bidders’ payoﬀs are higher than in the Nash equilibrium. In
these cases, pre-play cheap talk may aﬀect the outcomes of the game, since the bidders have an
incentive to coordinate on such equilibria.
JEL classification: C72; D44; D82; D83; L41
Keywords: Communication; Collusion; All-pay auctions
1 Introduction
An all-pay auction is a model of contest in which the participants expend resources trying to win a
prize, and the prize goes to whoever spends the most. This model is important for studying various
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economic phenomena, especially lobbying and other rent-seeking activities (Hillman and Samet,
1987; Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1993). It is typically assumed that in the all-pay auction the
bidders choose how much to bid without any prior contact with each other. Yet, in many situations
it is diﬃcult or impossible to prevent the bidders from engaging in cheap talk before the auction.
Thus it is important to understand whether and how pre-play cheap-talk communication aﬀects the
outcomes of the all-pay auctions.
Competition in the all-pay auctions is typically intense. For example, if it is commonly known
that the value of the good is the same for all bidders, then complete rent dissipation occurs in
all Nash equilibria, i.e. the total expected payments of the bidders are equal to the value of the
good, and each bidder gets a zero expected payoﬀ. Thus, if pre-play communication is allowed,
the bidders may want to try to coordinate their bidding in order to avoid cut-throat competition.
However, because of the antagonistic nature of the all-pay auction it is unclear whether informative
communication is possible. A bidder may not want to communicate his bidding intentions or
privately known value truthfully to the opponents because this information could be used against
him. Instead, each bidder, regardless of his value, might want to misguide the opponents into
bidding less aggressively. We show that in some environments pre-play communication is indeed
completely powerless, and the equilibrium outcomes of the game with communication are payoﬀ
equivalent to the equilibrium outcomes of the all-pay auction without communication. Perhaps
more surprisingly, we also show that there are situations when pre-play communication helps the
bidders to coordinate their behavior so that the intensity of bidding is reduced, and the bidders get
higher payoﬀs than in the all-pay auction without communication.
To study the all-pay auction with pre-play communication in the environments with complete
information we use the solution concept of correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974; 1987), and in
the environments with incomplete information — communication equilibrium (Myerson, 1982). Ac-
cording to the revelation principle for games with communication, which is discussed in Section 2,
the correlated and communication equilibria describe all possible outcomes that can be potentially
achieved with the help of communication in a self-enforcing way.1 In the all-pay auction models
1There are also other reasons to use correlated equilibrium as a solution concept. Correlated equilibrium has
arguably more compelling epistemic foundations than Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1987); it is easier for boundedly
rational players to learn to play correlated equilibrium than Nash equilibrium (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2013). Commu-
nication equilibrium is one of the most popular ways of extending the concept of correlated equilibrium to the games
with incomplete information (Forges, 1993; Bergemann and Morris, 2013).
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that we study there is either a unique Nash equilibrium, or all Nash equilibria result in the same
payoﬀs for the bidders. If it happens that in a given environment all correlated (communication)
equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium, then we can say that the Nash equilib-
rium prediction is robust to pre-play communication between the bidders. However, if there exist
correlated (communication) equilibria that are not payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium, then
pre-play communication may aﬀect the outcomes of the game. In particular, if in such correlated
(communication) equilibria the bidders get higher payoﬀs than in the Nash equilibrium, then they
have an incentive to coordinate on the former. Diﬀerent ways of organizing communication between
the bidders to realize the outcomes of the correlated and communication equilibria are discussed in
Section 5.
In Section 3 we study correlated equilibria in the all-pay auctions with complete information. We
show that with two bidders the correlated equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium
when there is no reserve price, or if the bidders are asymmetric (Proposition 2). In such cases the
all-pay auction is “strategically equivalent” to a particular zero-sum game, and for the two-player
zero-sum games the correlated and Nash equilibria are known to be payoﬀ equivalent (Moulin and
Vial, 1978). It turns out that this strategic equivalence does not hold when there is a reserve
price and the bidders are symmetric. For this case we construct correlated equilibria that are more
profitable for the bidders than the Nash equilibrium (Example 1 and Proposition 3). When there
are three or more symmetric bidders, such profitable correlated equilibria exist even when there is
no reserve price (Example 2 and Proposition 4). The idea of the constructions is to introduce some
imperfect negative correlation in the distribution of the bids. Say, when one of the bidders bids
aggressively, then with a certain probability his opponents are “suggested” to bid zero, and thus
save the cost of their bids.
In Section 4 we study communication equilibria in the all-pay auctions with independent pri-
vate values. Similarly to the case of complete information, we show that with two bidders the
communication equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium when there is no reserve
price (Proposition 6). That is, neither self-enforcing sharing of private information, nor correlation
of play is possible in this case. However, in other cases there exist communication equilibria that
are more profitable for the bidders than the Nash equilibrium. This is demonstrated for the case of
two bidders and a positive reserve price (Example 3 and Proposition 7), and for the case of three
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or more bidders and no reserve price (Proposition 9). The constructions involve correlating the
bidders’ play in a way that is similar to the correlated equilibria in Section 3. The bidders also
share some private information, but only to a limited extent because it is important to maintain
enough uncertainty about the opponents’ values and play for the construction to work.
Pre-play communication in auctions and contests is typically studied in context of collusion. For
example, most of the studies of collusion in static auctions focus on a scenario when the bidders
organize an explicit cartel that allows them to communicate, enforces coordinated behavior of the
bidders in the auction, and facilitates exchange of side payments between the bidders.2 The bidders’
collusion that is self-enforcing is for the most part considered in the context of repeated auctions.3
In such models the enforcement of the desired bidders’ behavior is provided by the expectations of
the future reaction of the opponents.
Only a few papers study collusion in static auctions when the behavior of the bidders in the
auction cannot be directly controlled. Marshall and Marx (2007, 2009), and Lopomo, Marx and Sun
(2011) study collusion in the first-price, second-price, and ascending-bid auctions under the following
scenario. The bidders make reports to a “center”; based on these reports, the center privately
recommends a bid to be made by each bidder, and requires payments from the bidders.4 If we
drop the possibility to exchange side payments before the auction, then such a model of collusion is
equivalent to assuming that the bidders play some particular communication equilibrium. Lopomo,
Marx and Sun (2011) show that in the first-price auction with discrete bids such a collusion is
completely ineﬀective: all collusive equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent to the unique Nash equilibrium.5
However, Marshall and Marx (2007) show that in the second-price auction such a collusion works
equally well as collusion in a model where the bidders behavior can be controlled by the cartel. In
fact, in the second-price auctions viable collusion is possible even when the bidders cannot exchange
side payments, i.e. there exist communication equilibria that are diﬀerent from the Nash equilibria,
and are more profitable for the bidders (Marshall and Marx, 2009).
In some cases it is reasonable to assume that the bidders can disclose private information about
2For example, Graham and Marshall (1987) study collusion in second-price auctions, and McAfee and McMillan
(1992) study collusion in first-price auctions.
3For example, Aoyagi (2003) studies self-enforcing collusion with pre-play communication in repeated auctions.
4Lopomo, Marshall and Marx (2005) and Garratt, Tröger and Zheng (2009) study self-enforcing collusion without
pre-auction side payments, but with a possibility of resale.
5See also Azacis and Vida (2010) for related results for the first-price auction with a continuum of bids.
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their valuations in a verifiable way. Benoit and Dubra (2006), Hernando-Veciana and Tröge (2011),
and Tan (2013) study the bidders’ individual decisions to disclose information in winner-pay auc-
tions. Kovenok, Morath and Münster (2010) and Szech (2011) study this problem in the all-pay
auctions. The relation of such an approach to our approach is discussed in Section 4.1.
There are also many experimental studies of the eﬀect pre-play communication in games. While
we are unaware of any research that studies exactly our setting, there is some related work. For
example, Harbring (2006) considers the eﬀect of communication in a repeated all-pay auction with
a cap on the maximal possible bids. Though there were only finitely many rounds, the bidders’s
behavior resembled collusive play in an infinitely repeated game, and the possibility of communi-
cation lead to lower bids and higher payoﬀs.6 More generally, experimental research has revealed
that pre-play communication often increases cooperation between the players beyond what is pre-
dicted by standard game-theoretic models, and this eﬀect is attributed to a combination of norms,
empathy, nonverbal cues, etc. (Camerer, 2003).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and the definitions of correlated and
communication equilibria are in Section 2. The all-pay auctions with complete information and
incomplete information are studied in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Discussion is in Section 5. The
proofs are relegated to the Appendix unless stated otherwise.
2 Model
There are  ≥ 2 bidders. Bidder  chooses a bid  from a set of possible bids . If there is no
reserve price, then  = [0∞). If there is a reserve price   0, then  = {0}∪ [∞), i.e., bidder
 can either submit a “null” bid  = 0, or an “active” bid  ≥ .7 If bidder  bids , and the other
bidders bid −, then bidder  wins the good with probability  ( −). If there is no reserve price,
then
 ( −) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0
1
1
#{: =}
if
if
if
  max 6= 
  max 6= 
 = max 6= 
6For a survey of other experimental research on contests see Dechenaux, Kovenok and Sheremeta (2012).
7Alternatively one can keep the action set  = [0∞), but this will result in an unnecessary multiplicity of
equilibria because there will be multiple possible “inactive” bids.
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If there is a reserve price   0, then
 ( −) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0
1
1
#{: =}
if
if
if
 = 0 or { ≥  and   max 6= }
 ≥  and   max 6= 
 ≥  and  = max 6= 
We consider both complete and incomplete information environments.
Complete information. Bidder  has a valuation   0 for the good, and the bidders’ values
(1  ) are commonly known. If bidder  bids , and the other bidders bid −, then his payoﬀ
is  ( −) =  ( −)− .
In the complete information case we study correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria. To define
a correlated equilibrium suppose there is a neutral trustworthy mediator who makes non-binding
private recommendations (possibly stochastic) to each bidder of which bid to submit. The recom-
mendations are made according to a correlation rule , which is a probability measure over the
set of all possible bid profiles  = Q=1 .8 Each bidder then decides which bid to submit as a
function of the mediator’s recommendation. Thus a pure strategy of bidder  is b :  → .
Definition 1 A correlation rule  is a correlated equilibrium if each bidder finds it optimal to obey
the mediator’s recommendations:
Z

 ()() ≥
Z


³b ()  −´() for every  and b (·) .
The significance of the correlated equilibrium for studying all-pay auctions with communication
is due to the revelation principle.9 According to it, for any Nash equilibrium of a game that consists
of some communication protocol followed by the all-pay auction, there exists an outcome equivalent
correlated equilibrium of the all-pay auction. There is no loss of generality in requiring that for
each player it is optimal to obey the mediator’s recommendations.
8All considered sets and functions are Borel measurable; all considered probability measures are Borel, with
topology of weak convergence.
9See Aumann (1974, 1987) and Myerson (1982). Cotter (1989) provides the revelation principle for the settings
with large action and type spaces.
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Let  be the marginal probability measure of  on :
 () =
Z
×−
() for every  ⊆ .
A Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium ∗ such that each bidder’s behavior is independent
from the actions of the opponents, i.e., ∗ is a product of its marginals Q=1 ∗ . Hence, both
Nash and correlated equilibria are joint plans of actions that are individually self-enforcing, but
correlated equilibrium allows for additional coordination by correlating recommendations to the
bidders. When we encounter a Nash equilibrium, we write it as a profile of the individual mixed
actions (∗1  ∗).
Incomplete information. Bidder  privately observes own value  ∈  = [ ] ⊂ R+.
The value of bidder  is distributed according to a probability measure  on , independently
from the valuations of the other bidders. This information structure is assumed to be common
knowledge. The payoﬀ of bidder  with value , who bids , while the other bidders bid −, is
 ( −; ) =  ( −) − . Denote  = Q=1  , and let  be a product measure Q=1  ,
and − =Q 6=  .
In the incomplete information case we study communication equilibria and Nash equilibria.
To define a communication equilibrium suppose the bidders first privately report their values to
a neutral trustworthy mediator, who then makes non-binding private recommendations (possibly
stochastic) to each bidder of which bid to submit. The recommendations are made according to
a communication rule , which is a family of probability measures {(·|)}∈ . That is, for each
profile of type reports  submitted to the mediator, (·|) is a probability measure over the set of
all possible bid profiles . Each bidder decides which type to report, and which bid to submit as a
function of the mediator’s recommendation. Thus a pure strategy of bidder  with value  specifiesb ∈ , the value to be reported, and b :  → , the rule for translating recommendations into
bids.
Definition 2 A communication rule  is a communication equilibrium if -a.e. type of each
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bidder finds it optimal to report the true type and obey the mediator’s recommendations:
Z
−
µZ

 (; )(|)
¶
− (−) ≥
Z
−
µZ


³b ()  −; ´(|b −)¶− (−)
for every , -a.e. , every b, and b (·) .
Similarly to the case of correlated equilibrium, the significance of communication equilibrium
for studying all-pay auctions with communication in a setting with nonverfiable information is due
to the revelation principle. For any Nash equilibrium of a game that consists of some communi-
cation protocol followed by the all-pay auction, there exists an outcome equivalent communication
equilibrium of the all-pay auction. There is no loss of generality in requiring that for each player
reporting the true type and obeying the mediator’s recommendation is optimal.
Let  (·|) be the marginal probability measure of  on  conditional on :
 (|) =
Z
−
ÃZ
×−
(| −)
!
− (−) for every  ⊆ .
A Nash equilibrium is a communication equilibrium ∗ such that each bidder’s behavior is indepen-
dent from the opponents’ reports and actions, i.e., for every  = (1  ), ∗ (·|) is a product of
marginals
Q
=1 ∗ (·|). Thus, relative to the Nash equilibrium, communication equilibrium allows
for self-enforcing sharing of private information between the bidders, as well as for coordination
via correlation of the recommended bids. When we encounter a Nash equilibrium, we write it as a
profile (∗1  ∗), where ∗ is {∗ (·|)}∈ for every .
3 All-pay auctions with complete information
3.1 Two bidders
In this section we study and compare Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of the all-pay auction
under complete information. The Nash equilibria of this game are well understood, and we simply
summarize the existing results. We are not aware, however, of any characterizations of the set of
correlated equilibria of the all-pay auction.
In games with finite number of actions the set of correlated equilibria is defined by finitely
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many linear inequalities: if player  has || possible actions, then there are || (||− 1) obedience
constraints that ensure that he has no incentive to deviate from the recommended actions. It is thus
straightforward to describe the extreme points of this set and to find the set of the players’ payoﬀs
achievable by the correlated equilibria. However, if each player has a continuum of possible actions,
then there is a double continuum of obedience constraints, which is diﬃcult to work with.10 One
possible approach is to discretize the action spaces and to use the linear programming tools. This
path is pursued, for example, in Lopomo, Marx and Sun (2011) in their study of collusive schemes
in the first price auction. In this paper we take a diﬀerent route. For some cases we characterize
correlated equilibria by exploiting a connection between the all-pay auction and a certain class of
zero-sum games, and in other cases we construct correlated equilibria directly.
We begin with the case of two bidders. Denote the diﬀerence in the bidders’ valuations by
∆ = 1 − 2, and without loss of generality assume ∆ ≥ 0. To avoid uninteresting cases we
assume that the valuations of both bidders are strictly above the reserve price  ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 In a complete information environment with two bidders:
(i) If  = 0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Bidder 1 bids uniformly on [0 2]; bidder 2
bids 0 with probability ∆1 , and bids uniformly on [0 2] otherwise. The bidders’ payoﬀs are
1 = ∆, 2 = 0.
(ii) If 1  2    0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Bidder 1 bids  with probability 2 , and
bids uniformly on ( 2] otherwise; bidder 2 bids 0 with probability ∆+1 , and bids uniformly
on ( 2] otherwise. The bidders’ payoﬀs are 1 = ∆, 2 = 0.
(iii) If 1 = 2 =     0, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. Bidder  bids 0 and  with
probabilities   and (1− )  (where  ∈ [0 1]), respectively, and bids uniformly on ( ]
otherwise; bidder  bids 0 with probability  , and bids uniformly on ( ] otherwise. The
bidders’ payoﬀs are 1 = 2 = 0.
Proof. Part (i) follows from Proposition 2 in Hillman and Riley (1989), part (ii) from Proposition
1 in Bertoletti (2008), and part (iii) from Proposition 3 in Siegel (2012).
10The principal-agent literature often uses a first-order approach for describing an agent’s best response. This
approach is not going to work here because a bidder’s expected payoﬀ is typically discontinuous in own bid.
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The Nash equilibria of the complete information all-pay auctions exhibit “rent dissipation”. The
bidder with the lower valuation gets a zero payoﬀ, while the bidder with the higher valuation gets a
payoﬀ equal to the diﬀerence in the valuations. In the case of symmetric bidders the rents are fully
dissipated: the total payments of the bidders are equal to the value of the good, and each bidder
gets a zero payoﬀ.
In general the set of correlated equilibrium payoﬀs is at least as large as the convex hull of the
payoﬀs of Nash equilibria: the players can use a public randomization device (or replicate it by a
jointly controlled lottery) to coordinate on diﬀerent Nash equilibria with diﬀerent probabilities.11
In the all-pay auction, however, this observation is not useful, because either the Nash equilibrium
is unique, or all Nash equilibria yield the same payoﬀs for the bidders. In certain games (like “the
chicken game”) there exist correlated equilibrium payoﬀs outside of the convex hull of the Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs, but the circumstances when this happens are not well understood.
It is known that the sets of correlated equilibrium payoﬀs and Nash equilibrium payoﬀs coincide
in the two-player zero-sum games (Rosenthal, 1974). Regardless of whether we consider Nash or
correlated equilibrium, each player has a strategy that guarantees him an expected payoﬀ at least as
large as his value of the game. Hence, by the minmax theorem, the players’ expected payoﬀs must
be equal to their respective values under either solution concept. While the all-pay auction game
is not a zero-sum game, in some cases it turns out to be “strategically equivalent” to a particular
zero-sum game (in a sense of Moulin and Vial, 1978). The next result takes advantage of this
observation and shows that the bidders’ correlated equilibrium payoﬀs are the same as under Nash
equilibrium.12
Proposition 2 In a complete information environment with two bidders, such that  = 0 or 1 
2, every correlated equilibrium is payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an auxiliary game with the same players and the same action spaces as in the
all-pay auction, and with the payoﬀs derived from the all-pay auction payoﬀs for every ( ) ∈ 
11For example, in the second-price auction without the reserve price there are many Nash equilibria: the truthful
equilibrium, and infinitely many equilibria involving weakly dominated strategies (Blume and Heidhues, 2004). If
the bidders correlate their play, then it is possible to sustain the following collusive scheme. Before the auction
a designated winner is randomly chosen; during the auction the bidders coordinate on the equilibrium where the
designated winner obtains the good for free by submitting a very high bid while the other bidders submit zero bids.
See Section V.A in the working paper version of Marshall and Marx (2009).
12The result in Proposition 2 for the case  = 0 follows from a more general result, Proposition 6 in Section 4.1,
that allows for incomplete information. However, the proof here is diﬀerent and more intuitive.
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as follows:
 ( ) = 1 ( ) +
1
  −
1
2
=  ( )− 1  +
1
  −
1
2
(1)
Note that 1 is strictly positive and
1 − 12 is independent of . This implies that the best response
of each bidder in the auxiliary game is the same as in the all-pay auction, and thus the two games
have the same Nash equilibria and the same correlated equilibria.
Next we show that the auxiliary game is zero-sum when  = 0 or 1  2. If  = 0, thenP2
=1  () = 1 for every  ∈ , and thus
P2
=1 () =
P2
=1  () − 1 = 0 for every  ∈ .
If   0, then P2=1  () = 1 for every , except for  = (0 0). Note, however, that bid 0 is
not rationalizable for bidder 1 when 1  2. This is because no rational bidder bids above his
value, and thus bidder 1 strictly prefers to bid slightly above 2 to bidding 0. Hence, although the
auxiliary game is not zero-sum, it can be turned into a zero-sum game by removing bid 0 for bidder
1. This operation will not disturb the Nash equilibria or correlated equilibria because bidding 0 is
not rationalizable for player 1, and is thus not played in either equilibrium.
We will use the following two properties of the zero-sum games: (i) the players’ expected payoﬀs
from any correlated equilibrium and from any Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game are equal to
their respective values of the game; (ii) if  is a correlated equilibrium of a zero-sum game, then
the pair of its marginals (1 2) is a Nash equilibrium. These properties have been established for
finite games (Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 in Rosenthal, 1974), but it is straightforward to show that
they also hold for zero-sum games with infinite strategy sets which have a Nash equilibrium.
Let (∗1 ∗2) be the Nash equilibrium strategy profile, and ( ∗1  ∗2 ) be the Nash equilibrium
bidders’ payoﬀs in the auxiliary zero-sum game. This Nash equilibrium is unique when  = 0 or
1  2 (Proposition 1). Then the expected payoﬀ of player  from any correlated equilibrium  in
the all-pay auction is
Z

 ()() = 
µZ

 ()()− 1
Z

() + 1
2
¶
= 
Ã
 ∗ − 1
Z

∗() + 12
!
where the first equality uses the definition of  (·) in (1); the second equality is true becauseR
 ()() =  ∗ by property (i) mentioned above, (1 2) is a Nash equilibrium by property
(ii), and (1 2) = (∗1 ∗2) by the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Hence, every correlated
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equilibrium of the all-pay auction is payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium.13
One may conjecture that the payoﬀ equivalence of Nash and correlated equilibria has something
to do with the fact that the Nash equilibrium is unique when  = 0 or 1  2. While there may be
some connection, the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in general does not imply payoﬀ equivalence
of Nash and correlated equilibria.14
Lopomo, Marx and Sun (2011) provide a result of a similar kind for the first-price auction
with two symmetric bidders and incomplete information. They show that collusion based on bid
recommendations and pre-auction side payments is completely ineﬀective: every such collusive
scheme is payoﬀ equivalent to the unique Nash equilibrium of the auction. This implies that in the
setting of Lopomo, Marx and Sun (2011) the correlated equilibria are also payoﬀ equivalent to the
unique Nash equilibrium. The first-price auction is not strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game,
and the proof in Lopomo, Marx and Sun (2011) seems to rely on very diﬀerent ideas.15
The case when 1 = 2 =  and   0 is distinct. The proof of Proposition 2 cannot be extended
to cover this case: though the all-pay auction can still be shown to be strategically equivalent to
the auxiliary game, this game is no longer a zero-sum game because the bid profile (1 2) = (0 0)
cannot be ruled out. (Indeed, in some Nash equilibria both bidders submit null bids with positive
probability.) Next, we show that in this case there exist correlated equilibria that are not payoﬀ
equivalent to the Nash equilibrium. Paradoxically, the presence of the reserve price may help the
bidders to avoid complete rent dissipation and thus be to the bidders’ advantage.
Example 1 Let 1 = 2 = 1, and  ∈ (0 1). The bidders are given recommendations according to
13An alternative way to finish the proof is to use Theorem 3 from Moulin and Vial (1978), which shows that for
any game that is strategically equilvalent to a zero-sum game there exist no “correlation scheme” that improves upon
all Nash equilibrium payoﬀs for both players. The class of “correlation schemes” in Moulin and Vial (1978) includes
correlated equilibria, as well as some other joint action plans that require certain commitment on the part of the
players.
14See example on p.204 in Moulin and Vial (1978).
15Specifically, they formulate the collusive problem as a linear programming problem, and, by discretizing the bid
spaces, manage to derive some properties of the dual problem which imply the result.
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the following probability distribution, where “bid above ” means “bid uniformly on ( 1]”:
1’s bid \ 2’s bid bid 0 bid above 
bid 0 0  (1− )
bid  2 0
bid above  (1− )  (1− )2
If bidder 1 is suggested to bid 0, then he knows that the opponent bids aggressively, and thus he is
content to submit a null bid. If bidder 1 is suggested to bid , then he knows that the opponent bids
0, and thus his best response is to bid . If bidder 1 is suggested to bid above , then his probability
distribution over the opponent’s bids is the same as in one of the Nash equilibria, and thus he is
indiﬀerent between all bids not higher than 1. Whether bidder 2 is suggested to bid 0 or to bid above
, he is indiﬀerent between all bids not higher than 1.
Bidder 1 gets a payoﬀ of 1− when he is suggested to bid , and a zero expected payoﬀ otherwise.
Hence, his ex ante payoﬀ is 2 (1− ). The expected payoﬀ of bidder 2 is zero.
Let us compare the above correlated equilibrium with a Nash equilibrium for some  ∈ [0 1]
(described in part (iii) of Proposition 1). Under the Nash equilibrium bid profiles (0 0) and ( 0)
are played with probabilities 2 and (1− ) 2, respectively, while under the correlated equilib-
rium (0 0) is never played, and ( 0) is played with probability 2. Hence, under the correlated
equilibrium the probability weight is shifted away from an unfortunate event (where both bidders
bid zero and no one wins the good) to a nice event (where bidder 1 wins the good at a low price
). Next, under the Nash equilibrium the event when bidder 1 bids 0 and bidder 2 bids above
 takes place with probability  (1− ), and the event when bidder 1 bids  and bidder 2 bids
above  takes place with probability (1− )  (1− ). Under the correlated equilibrium the former
event takes place with probability  (1− ) and the latter event does not happen. Hence, under
the correlated equilibrium the probability weight is shifted away from an unprofitable event (where
bidder 1’s bid  is wasted because bidder 2 bids above ) to a more profitable event (where bidder 1
bids 0 instead). Thus, the correlated equilibrium results in positive profits for bidder 1, while every
Nash equilibrium features full rent dissipation.
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The next result describes some other payoﬀs that can be achieved with correlated equilibria.16
Note that for a given reserve price  the sum of the bidders’ payoﬀs is constrained above by  − ,
and thus the result implies that the bidders can approximate “ideal collusion” as reserve price 
approaches .
Proposition 3 In a complete information environment with two bidders, such that  =  for
 = 1 2 and     0, for every (1 2) ∈ R2+ such that
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 + 222 ≤ 
2(−)
2
2
21 + 2 ≤ 
2(−)
2
there exists a correlated equilibrium that gives bidder  payoﬀ .
3.2 Three or more bidders
Here we consider the case of three or more bidders, and we restrict attention to the situations when
the bidders are symmetric. Suppose each bidder has a valuation  that it is strictly above the
reserve price  ≥ 0. It is known that in this case there are many Nash equilibria, in every one of
them complete rent dissipation takes place, and each bidder gets a zero payoﬀ.17
Unlike in the case of two players, a connection between the all-pay auction and a certain class
of zero-sum games is not going to allow us to obtain an analog of Proposition 2. In the zero-
sum games with three or more players there is no minmax theorem to rely upon, and the sets
of correlated equilibrium payoﬀs and Nash equilibrium payoﬀs no longer coincide. Hence, even
though in the case of no reserve price it is possible to construct an auxiliary zero-sum game that
is strategically equivalent to the all-pay auction, this does not imply that the correlated equilibria
and Nash equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent. Indeed, in the next example we describe a correlated
equilibrium where the bidders get positive payoﬀs.
Example 2 Let  = 3,  = 1, and  = 0. Consider the following symmetric correlation rule. First,
a pair of bidders is randomly chosen, with each pair being equally likely to be chosen. Next, the
16We conjecture that no other payoﬀs can be achieved by correlated equilibria, but we have not managed to prove
this because of the technical diﬃculties outlined in the beginning of this section.
17This follows from Proposition 8 in Section 4.2. For a characterization of Nash equilibria in the asymmetric cases
when there is no reserve price see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996).
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bidders receive private bid recommendations without being told whether they have been chosen. The
bidder who is not chosen is recommended to bid 0, and the chosen bidders are given recommendations
according to the following probability distribution, where “bid low” means “bid uniformly on
¡
0 12
¤
”,
and “bid high” means “bid uniformly on
¡
1
2  1
¤
”:
’s bid \ ’s bid bid 0 bid low bid high
bid 0 0 226 0
bid low 226
7
26
5
26
bid high 0 526
5
26
If a bidder is suggested to bid high, then he knows that he competes against one chosen opponent
who is equally likely to bid low or high. The probability of winning with bid  ∈ [0 1] is equal to ,
and thus the payoﬀ from any such bid is 0.
If a bidder is suggested to bid low, then he knows that he competes against one chosen opponent
who either bids 0, bids low, or bids high, with probabilities 17 ,
1
2 , and
5
14 , respectively. The probability
of winning with bid   0 is equal to min©+ 17  57+ 27ª, and thus the payoﬀ from any  ∈ ¡0 12¤
is 17 , and the payoﬀ from any  ∈
¡
1
2  1
¤
is below 17 .
If a bidder is suggested to bid 0, then he knows that either he was not chosen and thus faces
two potentially active opponents, or that he was chosen but only his opponent was suggested to
bid above 0. It is possible to show that the probability of winning with bid   0 is equal to
min
©
14
152 + 815 232 + 13
ª
, and thus the payoﬀ from any   0 is nonpositive.
In each case the bidder is willing to comply with the recommendation. Each chosen bidder gets
an expected payoﬀ of 17 when he is suggested to bid low (which happens with probability 713), and a
zero expected payoﬀ otherwise. Each pair of bidders is equally likely to be chosen, and thus each
bidder’s ex ante payoﬀ is 239 .
This bid rotation correlation scheme holds together due to careful management of the amount
of information revealed to each player. To see the basic idea, note first that there exists a Nash
equilibrium such that two bidders bid uniformly on (0 1], and the third bidder bids 0. Second,
suppose that in advance a mediator randomly chooses two bidders who are to take active roles in
the above Nash equilibrium, and each bidder is privately informed of his role. Finally, suppose that
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with a small probability a mediator “cheats” one of the chosen bidders, and, instead of informing
him that he is to take an active role, tells him to bid 0. If the probability of such “cheating” is
suﬃciently small, then the bidders will still be content to comply whenever they are recommended
to bid 0. This “cheating” reduces the intensity of bidding, and thus raises the bidders’ payoﬀs.18
The next result describes some other payoﬀs that can be obtained in symmetric correlated
equilibria for any given reserve price  and any number of bidders  ≥ 3.19 In particular, the
result implies that in the correlated equilibrium the bidders can avoid full rent dissipation. Even
in the limit, as the number of bidders increases without bound, the sum of the bidders’ expected
payoﬀs does not have to go to zero (e.g., when  = 0, in the best constructed correlated equilibrium
 → 29 as →∞).
Proposition 4 In a complete information environment with  ≥ 3 symmetric bidders, such that
 =  for every  and    ≥ 0, for every  ∈
h
0 2(−) (−2)
2+(−2)+22
(9−14)2+(6−8)+(+6)2
i
there exists a
correlated equilibrium that gives each player payoﬀ  .
4 All-pay auctions with incomplete information
4.1 Two bidders
In this section we study and compare Nash equilibria and communication equilibria of the all-pay
auction under incomplete information. The communication equilibrium solution concept is similar
to the correlated equilibrium in that it allows for coordination between the players via correlation of
the recommended actions. In addition, communication equilibrium gives the players possibilities to
talk about their private information. Like in the case of complete information, we would like to know
under what circumstances there exist communication equilibria that are not payoﬀ equivalent to the
Nash equilibrium, and, whenever such communication equilibria exist, we would like to understand
how they work.
Characterizing communication equilibria in games with large action spaces is challenging, in
18The actual correlated equilibrium in Example 2 is slightly more involved: the active bidders are in addition
recommended whether to bid high or low, and the probabilities of the mediator’s profiles of recommendations are
adjusted to ensure incentive compatibility.
19 It is possible to construct correlated equilibria with asymmetric payoﬀs, but we do not present them here. We
do not claim that the upper bound on the payoﬀ in the presented symmetric correlated equilibria is the highest one
could achieve.
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much of the same way as characterizing correlated equilibria is, because one has to deal with many
obedience incentive constraints. In addition, the players must be given incentives to report their
types truthfully, and one has to worry about compound deviations when a player first misreports
his type and then disobeys the recommended actions. For a class of environments we manage to
demonstrate payoﬀ equivalence between Nash equilibria and communication equilibria using an
approach similar to that under complete information (Proposition 2 in Section 3). For another
class of environments we build on the results on correlated equilibria from Section 3 and construct
communication equilibria that are distinct from Nash equilibria.
First, we summarize some of the existing results on Nash equilibria with two bidders that we
will refer to in this section.20
Proposition 5 In an incomplete information environment with two bidders:
(i) Let  = 0, bidder ’s value be continuously distributed on [0 1] with density that is continuously
diﬀerentiable and positive on (0 1), independently of the opponent’s value. There is a unique
Nash equilibrium, this equilibrium is in pure strategies, and it is strictly monotonic.
(ii) Let   0, bidder ’s value is 0 or  (such that   ) with probabilities  and 1 − ,
independently of the opponent’s value. Nash equilibrium exists. In every Nash equilibrium
type 0 of each bidder gets a zero payoﬀ, type  of each bidder gets a payoﬀ of max { −  0},
where  = max {1 2}.
Proof. Part (i) follows from Theorem 1 in Amann and Leininger (1996). See Appendix for the
proof of part (ii).
Our first result on communication equilibria is about the case of no reserve price. Note that it
involves rather mild restrictions on the distributions of the players valuations. Part (i) of Proposition
5 describes one set of suﬃcient conditions for existence of the unique Nash equilibrium, but there
are also others.21 Note that Nash equilibrium often fails to exist in the all-pay auction with no
20There exist other results on Nash equilibria of the all-pay auction with incomplete information, but many of them
are about the case of interdependent valuations which is not covered in this paper. See, for example, Krishna and
Morgan (1997), Lizzeri and Persico (2000), Siegel (2012).
21For example, the results of Siegel (2012) imply that the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique when there are
finitely many strictly positive values for every bidder.
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reserve price when the bidders’ values are equal to zero with positive probability, and so ruling out
such distributions does not seem very restrictive.
Proposition 6 Consider an incomplete information environment with two bidders and no reserve
price such that the values of the bidders are strictly positive with probability one, and there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium. Then every communication equilibrium is interim payoﬀ equivalent to the
Nash equilibrium.
The idea behind the result can be understood with the help of the connection between the
all-pay auction and the auxiliary zero-sum game introduced in the proof of Proposition 2. Since
the payoﬀs of the two games are related according to formula (1), it is easy to see that the best
responses for each type of each bidder for the two games coincide, even when there is uncertainty
about the opponent’s value. Suppose, first, that the bidders are not allowed to communicate about
their private information. Then we can consider the all-pay auction as a strategic form game, and,
in a similar way as in Proposition 2, we can show that using correlated recommendations does not
help to achieve payoﬀs diﬀerent from the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs.
Next, suppose that the bidders are allowed to communicate about their private information.
One would expect that in a zero-sum game the players are not too keen on truthfully revealing
their private information because it may be used against them by the opponents. This is indeed
confirmed by Proposition 6 that says that no payoﬀ-consequential voluntary sharing of private in-
formation is possible, and this result can be viewed as a version of the “no trade” result (Milgrom
and Stokey, 1982). Note that in any communication equilibrium a bidder can play the following
strategy: (i) regardless of own type randomize over the type reports according to the prior prob-
ability distribution; (ii) regardless of the mediator’s recommendations choose the same bids as in
the Nash equilibrium. It turns out that in our auxiliary zero-sum game each player can guarantee
himself at least his Nash equilibrium payoﬀ by playing such a strategy. The no trade result then
follows from the facts that the players have common prior, and that every allocation, including the
Nash equilibrium outcome, is ex ante Pareto eﬃcient (because the game is zero-sum).
Similarly to the case of complete information, a result analogous to Proposition 6 is likely to
hold in some environments with strictly positive reserve price if we can rule out the case when both
bidders choose null bids. This, for example, happens when there is no overlap in the supports of
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the bidders’ valuations, say, 2  1, and the reserve price is low enough, 1  . Then bid 0 is
not rationalizable for bidder 1 for any beliefs over the opponent’s types, because he prefers to bid
slightly above 2 to bidding 0. It remains an open question whether results analogous to Proposition
6 hold when the bidders have correlated or interdependent values.22
There exist some related results for the first-price auction under incomplete information. As
mentioned in the previous section, Lopomo, Marx and Sun (2011) study a model of collusion
with pre-auction communication, side payments and bid recommendations in the first-price auction
with two bidders. They show that in a symmetric environment with two possible types (with or
without reserve) and discrete bid spaces the collusive equilibria (and thus communication equilibria)
are payoﬀ equivalent to the unique Nash equilibrium.23 Azacis and Vida (2010) study a similar
environment in a model with continuum of bids. They show that several restricted versions of
communication equilibrium are payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium, and they conjecture that
the same is true for the canonical communication equilibrium.24
Kovenok, Morath and Münster (2010) consider the incentives of the bidders in the all-pay
auction to share their private information which is assumed to be verifiable. First, each bidder
decides whether to disclose his value to the opponent, after that the bidders play the all-pay auction
according to Nash equilibrium given their updated beliefs. In the case when the bidders’ disclosure
decisions take place after they observe the realizations of their values there exist equilibria with
full information disclosure as well as equilibria without any information sharing. In the model of
Kovenok, Morath and Münster (2010) the bidders can hide their information but cannot lie about
it, and this makes it is easier to achieve information revelation than in our setting. On the other
hand, our model is more conducive to sustaining information revelation in the following respect.
In Kovenok, Morath and Münster (2010) the bidders’ payoﬀs following any disclosure decision are
determined by the unique continuation Nash equilibria given the beliefs, but in our setting there
22 If bidder  is uncertain about his valuation , then a transformation of his payoﬀ according to formula (1) is likely
to change his best response, because in general  [1] 6= 1 []. For the case of correlated values it is unclear how
part (i) of the deviational strategy described in the previous paragraph has to be adjusted in order to guarantee a
bidder his Nash equilibrium payoﬀ.
23Lopomo, Marx and Sun (2011) check the robustness of the result by studying numerically other environments
with two bidders.
24Azacis and Vida (2010) also present several results on the optimal collusive schemes in the first-price auction with
omniscient mediator who is assumed to know the bidders values. In such a model the bidders can generally do better
than in the Nash equilibrium without communication: the mediator selectively reveals information on the bidders’
values to induce asymmetric beliefs which lead to less aggressive bidding. Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2012) also
study related constructions.
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may be multiple continuation correlated equilibria, and thus the bidders’ payoﬀs are not necessarily
uniquely determined by the beliefs. We demonstrate in the next example how this feature allows
to provide incentives for information revelation.
Example 3 Let  ∈ (0 1), bidder 1’s value is 0 or 1 with probabilities 1 and 1 − 1, bidder 2’s
value is 1 with probability 1. By part (ii) of Proposition 5 the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of each bidder
with value 1 is max {1 −  0}.
Consider the following scenario with pre-auction communication. Bidder 1 sends a cheap talk
message to bidder 2, and then the bidders play the all-pay auction according to Nash equilibrium
given the updated beliefs. It is easy to see that there is no cheap-talk equilibrium where bidder 1
truthfully reveals his type. If bidder 2 believes the announcement, then, after learning that 1 = 0,
bidder 2 bids  and expects to win with probability 1; after learning that 1 = 1, the bidders play
the Nash equilibrium that yields a zero payoﬀ to each bidder. But then bidder 1 of type 1 can do
better by reporting type 0, and then bidding slightly above . This observation can be generalized to
show that there are no cheap talk equilibria that result in payoﬀs that are diﬀerent from the Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs of the game without communication.25
This is no longer true if after a cheap talk announcement the bidders can correlate their play.
Let 1 ∈ (0 ), so that the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the game without communication are zero
for either type of bidder 1. Suppose type 0 of bidder 1 sends message , and type 1 randomizes
between messages  and 0, so that the posterior beliefs that bidder 1’s type is 0 following these
two messages are  + 2 (1− ) and 0, respectively. After message  the bidders play according to
the Nash equilibrium, and after message 0 according to the correlated equilibrium from Example 1.
Type 0 of bidder 1 has no incentive to deviate because he is not interested in bidding anything other
than 0. Type 1 of bidder 1 is willing to randomize between the messages because his expected payoﬀ
in either case is 2 (1− ).
Next we show that in the situations with two sided uncertainty there also exist communication
25Here is a sketch of the argument. If following every message the posterior probability that bidder 1 is of type
0 is not higher than , then after every message either type of bidder 1 gets zero payoﬀ in the continuation Nash
equilibrium. The prior belief 1 must also be not higher than , and hence the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the game
without communication are the same. If the posterior beliefs following some messages are above , then it is optimal
for bidder 1 of type 1 to send messages that induce the highest possible belief that bidder 1’s type is 0. However, since
the equilibrium posterior beliefs must reflect the strategy of bidder 1, the highest posterior belief cannot be greater
than the prior 1. Hence, the posterior beliefs after every message must be equal to the prior, which implies payoﬀ
equivalence with the Nash equilibrium of the game without communication.
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equilibria that result in the bidders’ payoﬀs that are higher than in the Nash equilibrium. The
behavior of the bidders of type  is coordinated in a way that is similar to the correlated equilibria
in the complete information case, and when  = 0 the construction is identical to that in the proof
of Proposition 3 for the case of symmetric payoﬀs.
Proposition 7 Suppose there are two bidders and   0. Each bidder’s value is 0 or  (such that
  ) with probabilities  and 1−, independently of the opponent’s value. Then for every  ∈ £0 ¢
there exists a communication equilibrium that gives each bidder of type  a positive payoﬀ.26
It is possible to show that in this environment all Nash equilibria are ineﬃcient in a sense that
the good sometimes remains unsold even though there is a bidder with value above the reserve
price. This is because at least one bidder with value above the reserve price submits a null bid with
positive probability.27 However, the constructed communication equilibrium is eﬃcient. If only one
bidder has a value above the reserve price, then this bidder submits an active bid, and thus gets the
good, with probability one; if both bidders have values above the reserve price, then with positive
probability only one bidder submits an active bid.
Such a construction clearly involves some sharing of information about the values between the
bidders. However, to provide the right incentives it is also important to maintain enough uncertainty
about the opponents’ values. For example, if it was known that the bidders’ reports are revealed
to their opponents with high probability, then it is possible to show that bidder of type  has a
profitable deviation. The idea is similar to that in Example 3: reporting type 0 induces the opponent
to bid at the reserve price, and thus it is profitable to report type 0 and then bid slightly above
the reserve price. To make such a deviation unprofitable it is necessary that the bidders of type
 bid aggressively enough when the opponent has reported type 0, and this is achieved through
maintaining suﬃcient uncertainty about the opponent’s type.
26 It can be shown that an analogous result holds for the case when  ∈    1

and  is suﬃciently high. The proof
is long, and thus not included in the paper.
27The ineﬃciency of Nash equilibrium is easy to observe when  ≈ 0 and  ≈ . Eﬃciency requires that each bidder
with value  submits an active bid, and thus the sum of the ex ante expected bids must be at least 2 (1− )  ≈ 2.
However, the bidders’ gross ex ante payoﬀ is only  1− 2 ≈ , which gives an impossibilty.
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4.2 Three or more bidders
Here we continue to work with the symmetric independent case when each bidder’s valuation can
be either 0 or . The Nash equilibrium payoﬀs when there are three or more bidders are described
next.
Proposition 8 Suppose there are  ≥ 3 bidders and  ≥ 0. Each bidder’s value is 0 or  (such
that   ) with probabilities  and 1− , independently of the opponents’ values. Nash equilibrium
exists. In every Nash equilibrium type 0 of each bidder gets a payoﬀ of zero, type  of each bidder
gets a payoﬀ of max©−1 −  0ª.
Note that there can be no communication equilibrium such that some bidder gets a payoﬀ below
his Nash equilibrium payoﬀ. Bidding 0 guarantees a payoﬀ of (at least) zero; bidding the reserve
price  leads to winning whenever all opponents have zero valuations, and thus guarantees a payoﬀ
of (at least) −1 − .
The next result demonstrates that there exist communication equilibria such that each bidder
gets a payoﬀ higher than in the Nash equilibrium. We focus on the case of no reserve price, but the
construction can be extended to the case of positive reserve price as well.
Proposition 9 In the environment described in Proposition 8, if  = 0, then for  suﬃciently small
there exists a communication equilibrium such that each bidder of type  gets a strictly higher payoﬀ
than in the Nash equilibrium.
5 Discussion
We have shown that in the case of two bidders all correlated and communication equilibria are payoﬀ
equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one
bidder has a strictly higher value. Hence, by the revelation principle for games with communica-
tion, the Nash equilibrium predictions in such cases are robust to pre-play communication between
the bidders. Specifically, the bidders’ expected payoﬀs and expected payments are unaﬀected by
allowing them to communicate with each other prior to the auction using any mediated or unmedi-
ated communication protocol (the bidders’ statements about their types cannot be verified).28 It
28Another implication is that the Nash equilibrium prediction is robust to the bidders’ having arbitrary correlated
beliefs about payoﬀ-irrelevant states of the world, as long as these beliefs are consistent with the common prior
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will be interesting to see if these payoﬀ equivalence results hold beyond the incomplete information
environments with independent private values.
The results on payoﬀ equivalence of Nash and correlated equilibria, and Nash and communication
equilibria can be extended to related two-player games such as all-pay auctions with general cost
functions (Siegel, 2009), as well as to models of contests where the determination of the winner
stochastically depends on the amount of resources committed by the participants.29 Using a payoﬀ
transformation similar to (1) in Proposition 2 it is possible to show that many versions of such
models are strategically equivalent to particular zero-sum games; this strategic equivalence can
then be used to establish payoﬀ equivalence of predictions under the diﬀerent solution concepts.30
We have demonstrated that in several particular settings with three or more symmetric bidders,
and two symmetric bidders and a positive reserve price, there may exist correlated and communi-
cation equilibria that are not payoﬀ equivalent to the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. Specifically, the
bidders’ payoﬀs can be higher than in the Nash equilibrium, but never lower. This suggests that
allowing the bidders to communicate before bidding may improve their payoﬀs, and, in case the
bids represent socially unproductive expenses, communication may be unambiguously good for the
society. On the other hand, if the bids represent transfers to the seller or some socially productive
activities, then one should take into account that though communication may improve the bidders’
payoﬀs and eﬃciency of the allocation, it may also result in less intense bidding. A characterization
of all environments where there exist correlated and communication equilibria distinct from Nash
equilibrium remains an open question. It may also be interesting to compute the set of all payoﬀs
that can be achieved by the communication or correlated equilibria in such cases, and verify if it is
true in general that the payoﬀ of any bidder cannot fall below his Nash equilibrium payoﬀ.
The correlated and communication equilibria describe all possible outcomes that can be poten-
tially achieved with the help of communication in a self-enforcing way. It is important to know
how exactly communication between the bidders can be organized if one wants to implement the
outcome of some particular correlated or communication equilibrium. One natural approach is to
find an extra player who is able to play the role of a mediator as described in Section 2. The
(Aumann, 1974).
29Such models include rent-seeking contests and models of conflict (Tullock, 1980; Hirshleifer, 1989), tournaments
between workers (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), R&D contests (Baye and Hoppe, 2003), etc.
30The connection with zero-sum games may also be useful for obtaining more general results on existence, uniqueness,
and payoﬀ characterization of Nash equilibria in such games.
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mediator should be able to communicate with each bidder privately, or, alternatively, he should be
able to communicate with each bidder by encrypted messages according to a previously agreed upon
code (Lehrer and Sorin, 1997). The mediator should also be able to commit to his communication
strategy, but if this is impossible, then in some situations “strategic mediators” can be used as
well.31
It may also be interesting to know if the outcomes of the correlated and communication equi-
libria can be implemented with a help of some unmediated communication procedure between the
bidders.32 Let us briefly discuss the case of two bidders. In our constructed correlated equilibria it
is essential that the bidders remain uncertain about the strategies that are recommended to their
opponents, and in the communication equilibria it is also important that the bidders are uncertain
about the values of the opponents. Thus it is unlikely that the outcomes of these correlated and com-
munication equilibria can be implemented by some simple unmediated communication procedure,
whereby the bidders directly communicate with each other, because such communication cannot
generate the desired correlated beliefs.33 This implies that successful unmediated communication
must use correlation devices and/or noisy communication channels.
To illustrate, here is one of many possible ways to implement the outcome of the correlated
equilibrium in Example 1. Bidder 2 with probability  announces to bidder 1 that he will bid 0,
and with probability 1 −  that he will bid above , and then bids in the auction according to
his announcement. The announcement is made in a foreign language such that bidder 1 is able
to understand it with probability , and the language ability of bidder 1 is known only to him. If
bidder 1 understands the announcement of bidder 2, then he optimally responds to it, i.e. bids 
if bidder 2 says he will bid 0, and bids 0 if bidder 2 says he will bid above . If bidder 1 does not
understand the announcement of bidder 2, he bids above .34
31For example, Ivanov (2010) investigates how strategic mediators can be used in sender-receiver games.
32One can use the existing results on implementation of correlated and communication equilibria without a mediator
for general games. See Forges (2009) for a survey. The constructions in these papers are for finite sets of actions, but
they can be adapted to implement the correlated and communication equilibria constructed here.
33 It also seems unlikely that there may exist other interesting correlated and communication equilibria that can be
implemented by direct unnmediated communication before the all-pay auction. In the environment with complete
information such pre-play communication only allows to achieve payoﬀs that are in the convex hull of the Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs of the game without communication (Forges, 1990). We conjecture that it is impossible to improve
upon the Nash equilibria using only such pre-play communication in the all-pay auction with incomplete information
as well.
34Blume and Board (2013) introduced the idea that instead of communication via a noisy communication channel
it is possible to use direct communication when there is uncertainty about the ability of the players to understand
some messages.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote  = 1− for  = 1 2, and fix (1 2) ∈ R2+ such that
2 + 2 ≤ 2. The bidders are given recommendations according to the following probability
distribution, where “bid above ” means “bid uniformly on ( ]”.35
1’s bid \ 2’s bid bid 0 bid  bid above 
bid 0 0 2 + (1− 1 − 2)
bid  1 0 0
bid above  + (1− 1 − 2) 0 −+ (1− 1 − 2)
Suppose bidder 1 is suggested to bid 0 and bids  ∈ ( ] instead.36 Then his payoﬀ is
Ã
2
2 + + (1− 1 − 2)
+

+ (1− 1 − 2)
2 + + (1− 1 − 2)
µ − 
 − 
¶!
 − 
=
21 + 22 − 2
(2 − 2)
³
2 + + (1− 1 − 2)
´ ( − ) ≤ 0
where the inequality follows from 21 + 22 ≤ 2. If bidder 1 is suggested to bid , then it is
clearly optimal to comply, since the opponent bids 0 in such case. If bidder 1 is suggested to bid
above , then he is indiﬀerent between all bids since the payoﬀ from bidding  ∈ [ ] is
µ
 +
³
1− 
´µ − 
 − 
¶¶
 −  = 0
To summarize, bidder 1 gets a payoﬀ of  −  when he is suggested to bid , and zero payoﬀ
otherwise. Hence, his ex ante payoﬀ is 1 ( − ) = 1. Using a similar argument for bidder 2, we
conclude that the considered correlation rule is a correlated equilibrium, and it achieves the desired
35 It is straightforward to verify that the entries in table: (i) sum up to one; and (ii) are nonnegative. The latter is
because
1 + 2 =
21 + 22+ 21 + 22
2 + 2 ≤
22
2 + 2  1
where the first inequality follows from 2 + 2 ≤ 2.
36Bidding exactly  is dominated by bidding slightly above  if there is a positive probability that the opponent
bids .
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payoﬀs.
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix  ∈ £0 ¤, where  = 2(−) (−2)2+(−2)+22(9−14)2+(6−8)+(+6)2 . Consider
the following symmetric correlation rule. First, a pair of bidders is randomly chosen, with each pair
being equally likely to be chosen. Next, the bidders receive private bid recommendations without
being told whether they have been chosen. The bidders who are not chosen are recommended to
bid 0, and the chosen bidders are given recommendations according to the following probability
distribution, where “bid low” means “bid uniformly on
¡ 12 ( + )¤”, and “bid high” means “bid
uniformly on
¡
1
2 ( + )  
¤
”, and where  = 1+
¡−
4 − 3+ 8
¢
.37
’s bid \ ’s bid bid 0 bid low bid high
bid 0 0  = 2−+ +− 2  = 2−
bid low  = 2−+ +− 2  = + 2  = 
bid high  = 2−  =   = 
If a bidder is suggested to bid 0, then he knows that either he was not chosen (which happens
with probability −2 ), or that he was chosen but only his opponent was suggested to bid above 0
(which happens with probability 2 ( + )).
If this bidder bids  ∈ ¡ 12 ( + )¤ instead, then he has a chance to win only if none of his
opponents bid high. In particular, bidder  could win if (i) he was not chosen, and one chosen bidder
bids low (which happens with probability −2 (2)); (ii) he was not chosen, and two chosen bidders
bid low (which happens with probability −2 ); (iii) he was chosen, and his opponent bids low
(which happens with probability 2). The expected payoﬀ this bidder is then
⎛
⎝
−2
 (2) + 2
−2
 +
2
 ( + )
Ã
− 
1
2 ( + )− 
!
+
−2
 
−2
 +
2
 ( + )
Ã
− 
1
2 ( + )− 
!2⎞
⎠  −  (2)
37 It is straightforward to verify that the entries in table: (i) sum up to one; and (ii) are nonnegative. The latter is
because
 − 
4
− 3 + 

8
 ≥  − 
4
− 3 + 

8
 = ( − )
2 ( + ) ((3− 4)  + )
2 ((9− 14) 2 + (6− 8)  + (+ 6) 2) ≥ 0
where the equality is by definition of  .
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Note that (2) is equal to − if  = . If  = 12 ( + ), then (2) becomes
−2
 (2 + ) + 2
−2
 +
2
 ( + )
 − 1
2
( + ) = 
8
(9− 14) 2 + (6− 8)  + (+ 6) 2
( − ) ((− 2)  +  + )
¡ − ¢ ≤ 0 (3)
where the inequality holds since  ≤  . Since (2) is convex in , this implies that it is nonpositive
for every  ∈ £ 12 ( + )¤.
If this bidder bids  ∈ ¡12 ( + )  ¤ instead, then he wins for sure if none of his opponents bid
high, and has a chance to win otherwise. In particular, bidder  wins for sure if (i) he was not
chosen, and none of the chosen bidders bid high (which happens with probability −2 (2 + ));
(ii) he was chosen, and his opponent does not bid high (which happens with probability 2).
Also bidder  could win if (i) he was not chosen, and one chosen bidder bids high (which happens
with probability −2 (2 + 2)); (ii) he was not chosen, and two chosen bidders bid high (which
happens with probability −2 ); (iii) he was chosen, and his opponent bids high (which happens
with probability 2). The expected payoﬀ of this bidder is thenÃ −2 (2 + ) + 2
−2 + 2 ( + )
+
−2 (2 + 2) + 2
−2 + 2 ( + )
Ã − 12 ( + )
 − 12 ( + )
!
+ (4)
+
−2 
−2 + 2 ( + )
Ã − 12 ( + )
 − 12 ( + )
!2⎞
⎠  − 
Note that (4) is equal to (3) if  = 12 ( + ), and (4) is equal to zero if  = . Since (4) is convex
in , this implies that it is nonpositive for every  ∈ ¡12 ( + )  ¤.
If a bidder is suggested to bid low, then he knows that he is chosen, and faces exactly one
chosen opponent. This opponent bids 0, low, or high with probabilities ++ ,
++ , and
++ , respectively. The expected payoﬀ of this bidder from bidding any  ∈
¡ 12 ( + )¤ is
Ã

 +  +  +

 +  + 
Ã
− 
1
2 ( + )− 
!!
 −  = 2
 ( +  + )
≥ 0
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If he bids  ∈ ¡12 ( + )  ¤ instead, then his payoﬀ isÃ
 + 
 +  +  +

 +  + 
Ã − 12 ( + )
 − 12 ( + )
!!
 − 
=

2
 ( +  + )
2 ( − )
 −  

2
 ( +  + )
If a bidder is suggested to bid high, then he knows that he is chosen, and faces exactly one
chosen opponent. This opponent bids 0, low, or high with probabilities ++ ,
++ , and
++ , respectively. The expected payoﬀ of this bidder from bidding any  ∈
¡
1
2 ( + )  12
¤
is
Ã
 + 
 +  +  +

 +  + 
Ã − 12 ( + )
 − 12 ( + )
!!
 − 
=
Ã
 + 
2 +
 − 

Ã− 12 ( + )
 − 
!!
 −  = 0
If he bids  ∈ ¡ 12 ( + )¤ instead, then his payoﬀ isÃ

 +  +  +

 +  + 
Ã
− 
1
2 ( + )− 
!!
 −  =
µ
 +
 − 

µ − 
 − 
¶¶
 −  = 0
Each bidder gets a payoﬀ of 2
 (++)
when he is suggested to bid low, and zero payoﬀ
otherwise. Hence, his ex ante payoﬀ is  . Thus the considered correlation rule is a correlated
equilibrium, and it achieves the desired payoﬀs.
6.2 Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5. (ii) In every Nash equilibrium, type 0 of each bidder bids 0 and gets a
zero payoﬀ. Let us represent the equilibrium strategy of bidder  of type  as a distribution function
 : {0} ∪ [∞) → [0 1], let  and  be the infimum and the supremum of the support of his
equilibrium bids, and let  ≥ 0 be his equilibrium payoﬀ.
Note that  ≤  − . Also note that bidder  of type  can secure a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to
− by bidding slightly above . Thus  ≥ −. Reversing the roles of  and , and rearranging,
we get  =  =  .
Next, note that bidder  of type  can secure a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to − by bidding slightly
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above , and thus winning when the opponent is of type 0. Hence,  ≥ max {1 −  2 −  0}.
If this inequality is strict, then neither bidder of type  bids 0 with positive probability, and thus
  ≥ . Moreover,   max {1 −  2 −  0} implies that each bidder of type  must be
winning with positive probability against the opponent of type . Then    is impossible, since
bidder  who bids below  always loses against the opponent of type . But  =  =  is impossible
either: the requirement of winning with positive probability against the opponent of type  implies
that both bidders bid  with positive probability, which cannot happen in equilibrium since each
bidder could profitably deviate to a slightly higher bid. Thus  = max {1 −  2 −  0}.
Let 1 ≤ 2. It is straightforward to check that the following is a Nash equilibrium. Types 0
of both bidders bid 0. Type  of bidder 1 bids 0 and  with probabilities min{−20}(1−1) and 2−11−1 ,
respectively, and bids uniformly on (min {(1− 2)  +  }] otherwise; type  of bidder 2 bids 0
with probability min{−20}(1−2) , and bids uniformly on (min {(1− 2)  +  }] otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 6. Denote by ∗ () the interim expected payoﬀ of player  of type 
in the Nash equilibrium (∗1 ∗2), and by  () the interim expected payoﬀ of player  of type 
in the communication equilibrium . Let  (·|) be the marginal probability measure of  on 
conditional on  (defined in Section 2).
By the definition of Nash equilibrium, for every  and -a.e. , it is unprofitable to deviate to
any strategy e(·|):
∗ () = 
Z

ÃZ

Z

 ()∗ (|)∗ ( |)
!
 ()−
Z

∗ (|) (5)
≥ 
Z

ÃZ

Z

 () e(|)∗( |)
!
 ()−
Z

e(|)
By the definition of communication equilibrium, for every  and -a.e. , it is unprofitable to de-
viate to the following strategy: first, randomize over the type reports according to , and then, re-
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gardless of the mediator’s recommendation, choose bids according to some bidding strategy e(·|):
 () = 
Z

µZ

 ()(| )
¶
 ()−
Z

(|) (6)
≥ 
Z

ÃZ

µZ


³b ´ e(b|)¶Z(|b ) (b)
!
 ()−
Z

be(b|)
= 
Z

ÃZ

Z


³b ´ e(b|)( |)
!
 ()−
Z

be(b|)
For every  and  6= 0, such that both (5) and (6) hold, perform the following operations. Take
(5) with e =  and (6) with e = ∗ , add the two resulting inequalities, and divide by . Then
for every  and -a.e.  we get
Z

ÃZ

Z

 ()∗ (|)∗ ( |) +
Z

 ()(| )
!
 () (7)
≥
Z

ÃZ

Z

 ()(|)∗ ( |) +
Z

Z

 ()∗ (|)( |)
!
 ()
Next, integrate (7) with respect to  over the set of types of bidder  for which inequality (7)
holds. Note that the resulting inequality continues to hold even if we integrate over  because (7)
is satisfied for -a.e. , and because we have assumed that  ({0}) = 0. Sum up the resulting
inequalities over :
Z

⎛
⎝
Z

Z

X
=12
 ()∗ (|)∗ ( |) +
Z

X
=12
 ()(| )
⎞
⎠ () (8)
≥
Z

⎛
⎝
Z

Z

X
=12
 ()(|)∗ ( |) +
Z

Z

X
=12
 ()∗ (|)( |)
⎞
⎠ ()
Since
P
=12  () = 1 for every , inequality (8) holds as an equality. This implies that the
following inequalities hold as equalities as well for -a.e. : inequality (5) when e = , and
inequality (6) when e = ∗ .
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Hence, for every , -a.e. , the following is true for any e(·|):
∗ () = 
Z

ÃZ

Z

 ()(|)∗ ( |)
!
 ()−
Z

(|)
≥ 
Z

ÃZ

Z

 () e(|)∗ ( |)
!
 ()−
Z

e(|)
and
 () = 
Z

ÃZ

Z

 ( )∗ (|)( |)
!
 ()−
Z

∗ (|)
≥ 
Z

ÃZ

Z

 ( ) e(|)( |)
!
 ()−
Z

e(|)
This implies that
¡∗  ¢ is a Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium bidder  of type  gets
payoﬀ  (), and bidder  of type  gets payoﬀ ∗ (). Since by assumption the Nash equilibrium
is unique, for every  we have  = ∗ , and thus ∗ () =  () for every -a.e. .38
Proof of Proposition 7. We show that for  ∈ £0 ¢ there exists a communication equilibrium
such that each bidder of type  gets a payoﬀ of (2−22)(−)2+2−22 . Consider the following symmetric
communication rule. If a bidder reports type 0, then he is suggested to bid 0. If a bidder reports
type  and his opponent reports type 0, then this bidder is suggested to bid  or “bid above ”
(which means “bid uniformly on ( ]”), with probabilities b = (−)(+)2+2−22 and 1− b, respectively.
If both bidders report type , then they are given recommendations according to the following
probability distribution.39
1’s bid \ 2’s bid bid 0 bid  bid above 
bid 0 0  = (−)2+2−22  = (−)(−)2+2−22
bid   = (−)2+2−22 0 0
bid above   = (−)(−)2+2−22 0  = (−)
2
2+2−22
38 If there are multiple Nash equilibria, then every communication equilibrium is interim payoﬀ equivalent to some
Nash equilibrium. We do not include this observation in Proposition 6 because we are not aware of any examples of
multiple Nash equilibria in this setting.
39 It is straightforward to verify that  ∈ [0 1] and that the entries in table: (i) sum up to one; and (ii) are
nonnegative (since   ).
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We need to check the incentives to tell the truth and to comply with the recommendations only
for the bidders of type , since the bidders of type 0 have no incentive to lie or to disobey.
If a bidder of type  has reported  and is suggested to bid 0, then he knows that his opponent
must be of type  and bids  or above , with probabilities + and + , respectively. If this
bidder bids  ∈ ( ] instead, then his payoﬀ is40
µ 
 +  +

 + 
µ − 
 − 
¶¶
 −  =
µ
 +
 − 

µ − 
 − 
¶¶
 −  = 0
If a bidder of type  has reported  and is suggested to bid , then it is clearly optimal to comply,
since the opponent bids 0, regardless of the type, in such case.
If a bidder of type  has reported  and is suggested to bid above , then he knows that either
his opponent is of type 0 and thus bids 0, or his opponent is of type  and bids 0 or high, with
probabilities (1−)(1−)+(1−)(+) ,
(1−)(1−)+(1−)(+) , and
(1−)(1−)+(1−)(+) , respectively. The
expected payoﬀ of this bidder from bidding any  ∈ [ ] is
µ  (1− b) + (1− )
 (1− b) + (1− ) ( + ) + (1− ) (1− b) + (1− ) ( + )
µ − 
 − 
¶¶
 − 
=
µ
 +
 − 

µ − 
 − 
¶¶
 −  = 0
To summarize, if a bidder of type  truthfully reports his type and follows the recommendations,
then he gets a payoﬀ of  −  when he is suggested to bid , and zero payoﬀ otherwise. Hence, his
ex ante payoﬀ is (b + (1− )) ( − ) = (2−22)(−)2+2−22 .
If a bidder of type  has reported 0, then he is suggested to bid 0. He knows that either his
opponent is of type 0 and thus bids 0, or his opponent is of type  and bids  or above , with
probabilities , (1− ) b, and (1− ) (1− b), respectively. If this bidder bids  ∈ ( ], then his
payoﬀ is
µ
(+ (1− ) b) + (1− ) (1− b)µ −  − 
¶¶
− ≤ max {(+ (1− ) b)  −  0} = ¡2 − 22¢ ( − )2 + 2 − 22
where the inequality follows from the fact that payoﬀ is a linear function of  and is thus maximized
40Bidding exactly  is dominated by bidding slightly above  if there is a positive probability that the opponent
bids .
32
either at  =  or at  = .
Thus the considered communication rule is a communication equilibrium, and it achieves the
desired payoﬀs.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is similar to the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 5. In every
Nash equilibrium, type 0 of each bidder bids 0 and gets a zero payoﬀ. Let the equilibrium strategy
of bidder  of type  be represented by distribution function  : {0} ∪ [∞)→ [0 1],  and  be
the infimum and the supremum of the support of his equilibrium bids, and  ≥ 0 be his equilibrium
payoﬀ.
Note that  ≤ Q 6= ¡+ (1− ) ¡¢¢  − . Also note that bidder  of type  can secure
a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to Q 6= ¡+ (1− ) ¡¢¢  −  by bidding slightly above . Thus
 ≥ . Since this is true for every pair of  and , we have  =  for every .
Next, note that bidder  of type  can secure a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to −1 −  by bidding
slightly above , and thus winning when the opponent is of type 0. Hence,  ≥ max©−1 −  0ª.
If this inequality is strict, then neither bidder bids 0 with positive probability, and thus  ≥  for
every . Moreover,   max©−1 −  0ª implies that each bidder of type  must be winning
with positive probability against some opponent of type . Then it is impossible to have    =
min 6=  , since bidder  who bids below  always loses against the opponents of type . But  = 
is impossible either: the requirement of winning with positive probability against some opponent
of type  implies that the bidders who bid  must do so with positive probability, which cannot
happen in equilibrium since each bidder could profitably deviate to a slightly higher bid. Thus
 = max©−1 −  0ª.
It is straightforward to check that the following is a Nash equilibrium. Type 0 of each bidder
bids 0. Type  of each bidder bids 0 with probability  = 11−
³
max
n¡ 

¢ 1−1 −  0o´, and bids
according to  () = 11−
µ¡
max
©−1 −   0ª+ ¢ 1−1 − ¶ on ¡min©¡1− −1¢  +  ª¤.
Proof of Proposition 9. We show for suﬃciently small   0 there exists a communication
equilibrium such that each bidder of type  gets a payoﬀ of 2−1. Consider the following symmetric
communication rule. If a bidder reports type 0, then he is suggested to bid 0. If exactly one bidder
reports , then this bidder is suggested to“bid low” (which means “bid uniformly on ¡0 12¤”). If
  1 bidders report , then a pair of bidders out of these  bidders is randomly chosen, with each
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pair being equally likely to be chosen. The bidders receive private bid recommendations without
being told whether they have been chosen. The bidders who are not chosen are recommended to
bid 0, and the chosen bidders are given recommendations according to the following probability
distribution where “bid high” means “bid uniformly on
¡
1
2 
¤
”, and where
 = −1P
=1
(− 1)!
! (− 1− )! (1− )
 −1−
µ
2
 + 1
¶
= 2
µ
1

1− 
1−  − 
−1
¶
is the probability that a bidder who submitted report  was chosen and that he is not the only one
who submitted .41
’s bid \ ’s bid bid 0 bid low bid high
bid 0 0  = 1−1 0
bid low  = 1−1  = 14 + 1−1  = 14 − 1−1
bid high 0  = 14 − 1−1  = 14 − 1−1
We need to check the incentives to tell the truth and to comply with the recommendations only
for the bidders of type , since the bidders of type 0 have no incentive to lie or to disobey.
If a bidder of type  has reported  and is suggested to bid 0, then he knows that either he
was not chosen (which happens with probability 1− −1 − ), or that he was chosen but only his
opponent is suggested to bid above 0 (which happens with probability ).
If this bidder bids  ∈ ¡0 12¤ instead, then he has a chance to win only if none of his opponents
bid high. In particular, bidder  could win if (i) he was not chosen, and one chosen bidder bids low
(which happens with probability
¡
1− −1 − ¢ 2); (ii) he was not chosen, and two chosen bidders
bid low (which happens with probability
¡
1− −1 − ¢); (iii) he was chosen, and his opponent
bids low (which happens with probability ). The expected payoﬀ of this bidder is then
⎛
⎝
¡
1− −1 − ¢ 2 + 
1− 
Ã

1
2
!
+
¡
1− −1 − ¢
1− 
Ã

1
2
!2⎞
⎠  −  (9)
41 It is straightforward to verify that the entries in table: (i) sum up to one; and (ii) are nonnegative for  suﬃciently
small (since  = 2 when  = 0).
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Note that (9) is equal to 0 if  = 0. If  = 12, then (9) becomes
Ã¡
1− −1 − ¢ (2 + ) + 
1− 
!
 − 1
2
 =
⎛
⎝
³
31−−1 − 94
´
−1
1−  −
1
4
⎞
⎠  (10)
Note that (10) is equal to −14 if  = 0, and that (10) is continuous in . Thus for  small enough
(9) is nonpositive at  = 0 and at  = 12, and it is convex in  on
¡
0 12
¤
, which implies that (9) is
nonpositive for every  ∈ ¡0 12¤.
If this bidder bids  ∈ ¡12 ¤ instead, then he wins for sure if none of his opponents bids high,
and has a chance to win otherwise. In particular, bidder  wins for sure if (i) he was not chosen, and
none of the chosen bidders bid high (which happens with probability
¡
1− −1 − ¢ (2 + ));
(ii) he was chosen, and his opponent does not bid high (which happens with probability ). Also
bidder  could win if (i) he was not chosen, and one chosen bidder bids high (which happens with
probability
¡
1− −1 − ¢ 2); (ii) he was not chosen, and two chosen bidders bid high (which
happens with probability
¡
1− −1 − ¢). The expected payoﬀ of this bidder is then
Ã¡
1− −1 − ¢ (2 + ) + 
1−  +
¡
1− −1 − ¢ 2
1− 
Ã− 12
1
2
!
+ (11)
+
¡
1− −1 − ¢
1− 
Ã− 12
1
2
!2⎞
⎠  − 
Note that (11) is equal to (10) if  = 12, and (11) is equal to zero if  = . Thus for  small enough
(11) is nonpositive at  = 12 and at  = , and it is convex in  on
¡
1
2 
¤
, which implies that (11)
is nonpositive for every  ∈ ¡12 ¤.
If a bidder of type  has reported  and is suggested to bid low, then he knows that either he
faces no opponents (with probability −1), or that he was chosen and faces one chosen opponent
who bids 0, low, or high with probabilities , , and , respectively. The expected payoﬀ of
this bidder from bidding any  ∈ ¡0 12¤ isÃ
−1 + 
−1 +  ( +  + ) +

−1 +  ( +  + )

1
2
!
 −  = 2
−1
2−1 + 12
≥ 0
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If he bids  ∈ ¡12 ¤ instead, then his payoﬀ isÃ
−1 +  ( + )
−1 +  ( +  + ) +

−1 +  ( +  + )
Ã− 12
1
2
!!
 −  = 2
−1
2−1 + 12
Ã
 − 
1
2
!
 2
−1
2−1 + 12
If a bidder of type  has reported  and is suggested to bid high, then he knows that he was
chosen and faces one chosen opponent who bids low or high, with equal probabilities. Thus the
expected payoﬀ of this bidder from bidding any  ∈ (0 ] is equal to zero.
To summarize, if a bidder of type  truthfully reports his type and follows the recommendations,
then he gets a payoﬀ of 2−1
2−1+1
2
 when he is suggested to bid low, and zero payoﬀ otherwise. Hence,
his ex ante payoﬀ is 2−1.
If a bidder of type  has reported 0, then he is suggested to bid 0. He knows that he faces
no active opponents with probability −1; one active opponent who bids low with probability
(− 1) (1− ) −2 + 2, where  = ¡1− −1 − (− 1) (1− ) −2¢; two active opponents who
both bid low, both bid high, or one bids low and another high with probabilities , , and
2, respectively.
If this bidder bids  ∈ ¡0 12¤, then his payoﬀ is
⎛
⎝−1 + ¡(− 1) (1− ) −2 + 2¢Ã 1
2
!
+ 
Ã

1
2
!2⎞
⎠  −  (12)
Note that if  = 0, then (12) is equal to −1 which is smaller than the payoﬀ from truthtelling
2−1. If  = 12 then (12) becomes
¡−1 + (− 1) (1− ) −2 +  (2 + )¢  − 1
2
 (13)
Note that (13) is equal to −14 if  = 0, and that (13) is continuous in . Thus for  small enough
(12) is smaller than 2−1 at  = 0 and at  = 12, and it is convex in  on
¡
0 12
¤
, which implies
that (13) is smaller than the payoﬀ from truthtelling 2−1 for every  ∈ ¡0 12¤.
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If this bidder bids  ∈ ¡12 ¤, then his payoﬀ is
⎛
⎝−1 + (− 1) (1− ) −2 +  (2 + ) + 2
Ã− 12
1
2
!
+ 
Ã− 12
1
2
!2⎞
⎠  −  (14)
Note that (14) is equal to (13) if  = 12, and (14) is equal to zero if  = . Thus for  small enough
(14) is smaller than 2−1 at  = 12 and at  = , and it is convex in  on
¡
1
2 
¤
, which implies
that (14) is smaller than the payoﬀ from truthtelling 2−1 for every  ∈ ¡12 ¤.
Thus the considered communication rule is a communication equilibrium, and it achieves the
desired payoﬀs.
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